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Abstract
Recent and projected developments in the Arctic call for improving emergency preparedness in 
the region. Arctic emergency preparedness is facing traditional challenges on a new scale as well as 
new, non-traditional challenges. There is political will on the part of Russian leadership to create 
a comprehensive emergency preparedness system in the Arctic, a system that integrates non-tradi-
tional alongside traditional emergency preparedness. This paper examines the formal institutional 
foundation for developing an emergency system in the Russian Arctic that includes counterterror-
ism as well as search and rescue and oil spill response. The paper concludes that the strengthening 
of Russian counterterrorism in recent years has produced a parallel specialized structure that oper-
ates autonomously and in isolation from the emergency preparedness structures responsible for 
handling traditional challenges. Differences between the national system for countering terrorism 
and the unified state system for prevention and liquidation of emergencies hinder comprehensive 
emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic. That being said, there is considerable overlap in 
central actors between the two systems. This may serve as a window of opportunity for cooperation 
in Arctic emergency preparedness.
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1 The Arctic: Great Promise – Great Danger
The Russian Arctic holds many and varied resources, and Russia has ambitious 
plans for utilising them. According to Russia’s Arctic Policy, the Arctic should secure 
the country’s supply of hydrocarbons, biological resources and other raw materials, 
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and the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation should become Russia’s main base 
for strategic resources by 2020.1 The Northern Sea Route should be developed as 
an alternative route for Eurasian transit,2 a prospect that could – in the long run – 
prove decisive for international shipping with accompanying geopolitical ripple 
effects. There have been bouts of increased economic and military activity in the Rus-
sian Arctic. A case in point is the Yamal LNG Project with the production and ship-
ping of liquefied natural gas from Sabetta in Yamalo-Nenets. Another is the building 
and reopening of military bases along the Arctic coast from the “Arctic Shamrock” 
on Aleksandra Land (Franz Josef Land) in the West to the “Northern Clover” on 
Kotelnyy Island (Novosibirsk Archipelago) in the East. The timeline for Russia’s 
plans for the Arctic is highly unrealistic; current obstacles to further develop ment of 
off-shore oil and gas deposits simply serve to underscore the overly ambitious nature 
of such plans. In a long term perspective, however, Russia will probably manage to 
carry out some of its plans.
More activity in the Arctic means that the region is facing new challenges as well 
as traditional challenges on a new scale. Traditional challenges are first and foremost 
to ensure adequate search and rescue (SAR) and oil spill response (OSR) in an 
inhospitable and remote corner of the world. A non-traditional challenge in the Arc-
tic is counterterrorism (CT). Arctic counterterrorism is a new issue and, arguably, 
one that is particularly testing. Stretching limited resources across vast territory that 
requires especially costly equipment due to its climate is a well-known challenge for 
activities in the Arctic. The nascent field of Arctic counterterrorism must also grap-
ple with the fact that it is a trendy but tardy addition to the emergency preparedness 
agenda in the region. Despite these and other asymmetries between Arctic SAR, 
Arctic OSR and Arctic CT, there is will on the part of Russian leadership to create a 
comprehensive emergency preparedness system in the Arctic that includes counter-
terrorism alongside traditional emergency preparedness.
Creating a comprehensive emergency preparedness system (sistema kompleksnoy 
bezopasnosti) to protect the territory, people and critical entities in the Arctic from 
emergencies (natural and man-made) is among the tasks laid down in Russia’s Arctic 
Policy.3 Speaking to the Russian Security Council on the topic of implementing state 
policy in the Arctic, President Vladimir Putin highlighted terrorism among potential 
threats that must be countered to ensure comprehensive emergency preparedness in 
the Arctic.4 Including terrorism among potential challenges in the Arctic is not as 
farfetched as it may appear at first glance. There is a well-documented preference 
among terrorists to target energy facilities.5 This feeds concerns that Arctic energy 
facilities may become targets. In his speech to the Russian Security Council, President 
Putin emphasised that oil and gas facilities, loading terminals, and pipelines must be 
adequately protected from terrorists and other potential threats.6 Commenting on 
Russia’s counterterrorist effort in the Arctic, Head of the Federal Security Service 
and of the National Antiterrorism Committee, Aleksandr Bortnikov, observed that it 
“has some faults, especially in ensuring the security of the Northern Sea Route and 
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maritime based economic enterprises”.7 Bortnikov has called for improved regu-
lation to protect assets in the Arctic, with particular mention of Russia’s icebreaker 
fleet, maritime drilling rigs and underwater facilities as well as Northern Sea Route 
infrastructure.8 A testament to Russia’s attention to potential terrorist threats in the 
Arctic is regular counterterrorism exercises in the region. Many of these exercises 
involve scenarios where “terrorists” target shipping and energy facilities.9
Addressing complex and developing threats to safety and security in the Russian 
Arctic comprehensively is a commendable aim. Creating a comprehensive system 
that covers this vast territory and that covers emergency preparedness fields with 
highly different “footprints” in the Arctic is no straightforward matter. Strategic doc-
uments tend to be rife with good intentions that may or may not translate into action. 
We are right to question whether Russia’s comprehensive emergency preparedness 
system may end up in the list of good, but unrealised, intentions. For one thing, 
traditional emergency preparedness has been on the agenda for a long time already, 
yet there are no explicit plans as to how existing systems will relate to, merge with, 
integrate in or be replaced by a new comprehensive system. Empirically, it appears 
that a comprehensive emergency preparedness system is set to develop organically 
and incrementally without overarching reforms. This ad hoc approach places much 
of the strain on the collective of individual systems; and specifically on their ability 
to rise to the challenge and, in some form or another, come together in the name 
of comprehensive emergency preparedness in the Arctic. The research question this 
article seeks to answer is this: Are SAR, OSR and CT structures in the Arctic con-
ducive to comprehensive emergency preparedness in the region? Answering this 
question furthers our knowledge about the Arctic as a region in Russia’s emergency 
preparedness system(s), and allows us to assess the structural foundation for a com-
prehensive emergency preparedness system that covers traditional and untraditional 
challenges in the Russian Arctic.
In order to answer the research question, this study uses the comparative method. 
This method helps us identify similarities and difference among the three fields’ 
structures that can affect the overarching structure, the architecture, of compre-
hensive emergency preparedness in the Arctic. The comparative method is flexible 
as regards subject matter and sources. Case studies of the various fields’ structures 
can therefore be highly informative in and of themselves. In order for the compari-
sons to yield insights in a more structured manner, this study pays particular atten-
tion to a few organisational principles: vertical/horizontal organisations, territorial 
or functional organisations, and centralised/decentralised decision-making. In order 
to discuss potential effects of the similarities and/or differences among the various 
structures, this study makes use of a typology for diversity that includes predicted 
outcomes for various types and degrees of similarity/difference. These are presented 
in the next section. The study makes use of various sources. The main sources of 
information are the official documents that describe and prescribe the emergency 
preparedness structures under study. These documents were sourced from official 
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channels and legal databases. The study also makes use of information issued by the 
various actors involved in emergency preparedness. Lastly, the study supplements 
these primary sources with secondary sources.
The paper argues that there are significant structural hindrances to integrated 
emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic. On the one hand, there are multiple 
and varied SAR and OSR systems in place. This complicates coordination among 
a large number of actors involved in these activities. On the other hand, there is a 
simple and symmetrical CT system in place that facilitates coordination among the 
many actors involved in this field. While responsibility for coordinating CT rests 
with one actor, responsibility for SAR and OSR activities are divided among sev-
eral different coordinating and managing actors with diffusely delineated areas of 
responsibility. That said, there is opportunity for cooperation and flexibility in the 
architecture of Russia’s Arctic emergency preparedness, as well as potential for inter-
nal competition. Involvement of many different actors is a feature SAR, OSR and 
CT all have in common. What is more, in many cases, it is also the very same actors 
that are involved. This, the paper argues, may prove helpful to promote comprehen-
sive emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic.
In the next section, we will flesh out the scope of the analysis and present the ana-
lytical tools. Section 3 discusses SAR and OSR. Section 4 discusses CT. Section 5 
discusses the architecture of emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic based on 
the preceding sections. Section 6 concludes.
2 Structures and Architecture
The topic of this paper can be summed up as a study of the architecture of Russia’s 
emergency preparedness in the Arctic. “Architecture” here refers to the composite 
structure (the super-structure) that emerges when the structures of the three emer-
gency preparedness fields are considered together. Structure is one of two dimen-
sions, for lack of a better word, that make up a system. The other dimension is 
practice (informal institutions) and will not be considered here. This sole focus on 
structure should in no way be interpreted as a claim that practice is unimportant. 
Practice is important in its own right; and, to fully understand systems, it is also 
important to analyse the interaction between structure and practice. That we here 
analyse structure, rather than practice or both structure and practice, has both ana-
lytical and practical motives. A comprehensive emergency preparedness system that 
transcends the traditional fields of emergency preparedness in the Arctic is a novel 
and under-analysed topic. It is also a big topic and its analysis ought to be operation-
alised sequentially. Since formal institutions set the scope for informal institutions 
(through their shortfalls well as in positive terms), it is appropriate to analyse struc-
ture in the first instance. Furthermore, to study practice requires the use of alterna-
tive sources, such as, ideally, the practitioners themselves. Access to such sources is 
limited. Counterterrorism is a particularly sensitive topic in this regard. This serious 
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challenge affects analyses of practice, but it does not impede us from furthering our 
understanding of the SAR, OSR and CT structures and the architecture of Russia’s 
emergency preparedness in the Arctic.
In order to discuss whether the architecture in place is conducive to achieve the 
stated goal of comprehensive emergency preparedness, it will benefit us to lay down a 
few organisational principles that we can work with: vertical/horizontal organisations, 
territorial or functional organisations, and centralised/decentralised decision-making. 
These principles can aid our understanding of the emergency preparedness structures 
and how they come together in the architecture of Arctic emergency preparedness.
Vertical/horizontal organisations. Structures can vary in terms of how tall or flat they 
are. Tall structures are characterised by middle-management that separates the top 
of the structure, say the emergency preparedness leadership, from the bottom of the 
structure, emergency personnel. In flat structures, on the other hand, there is less 
distance between the leadership at the top and the practitioners at the bottom. How 
tall or flat a structure is thus does not depend on the number of units on its levels but 
on the number of levels. As a rule of thumb, we will here consider any structure with 
1-2 levels as flat and any structure with 5 or more levels as tall, while structures with 
3-4 levels are considered moderate on the vertical/horizontal continuum.
Territorial or functional organisations. Structures can be organised territorially or func-
tionally. Say we have countries A and B that each has three regions 1, 2 and 3 and 
that are both in the process of institutionalising search and rescue, oil spill response 
and counterterrorism, incidentally. Country A introduces a territorial structure with 
regional preparedness organisations in each of regions 1, 2 and 3 that handle the 
three fields. Country B opts for a functional structure with a search and rescue 
organisation, an oil spill response organisation and a counterterrorism organisation 
each with regional branches in 1, 2 and 3.
Centralised/decentralised decision-making. The degree of centralisation or decentral-
isation of a structure can be reflected in its degree of vertical/horizontal organisa-
tion, but not necessarily. Regardless of how tall or flat a structure is, there is still a 
degree of flexibility as to how centralised or decentralised its decision-making is. 
Where decision-making sits and the degree of centralisation/decentralisation in deci-
sion-making can have significant effects on a structure’s ability to coordinate efforts. 
In line with this study’s topic, we treat decision-making only in terms of where in 
the structure decision-making competencies are concentrated or whether they are 
dispersed – without venturing to evaluate the practice of decision-making.
We here deal with ideal types and reality seldom does us the favour of displaying 
ideal types, so we shall use these different types as inspiration to tease out how the 
emergency preparedness structures compare rather than use them as blueprints for 
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identification. It is also necessary to reflect on how we should interpret differences 
and similarities among the emergency preparedness structures and diversity within 
the architecture of Arctic emergency preparedness. In this respect we can make 
use of David Harrison and Katherine Klein’s diversity typology that operationa-
lises diversity as separation, variety or disparity in organisations.10 The three types of 
diversity are cross-tabulated with the amount of diversity: minimum, moderate and 
maximum. The minimum categories in the typology capture similarities while the 
moderate and maximum categories capture degrees of difference. Separation cap-
tures diversity in positions along a single continuous attribute – in our case, the verti-
cal/horizontal continuum. Variety captures diversity in categorical attributes -- in our 
case, territorial or functional organisation. Disparity captures diversity in amount or 
proportion of a socially valued or desired resource – in our case, decision-making. 
These three diversity types are commonly associated with different outcomes. Sep-
aration can reduce cohesiveness and decrease task performance. Variety can foster 
greater creativity, innovation, flexibility, and decision-quality, as well as task conflict. 
Disparity can lead to internal competition, reduced member input and withdrawal.11 
By coupling the organisational principles and the diversity typology, we can take 
our comparative analysis of the emergency preparedness structures a step further. 
Beyond observing similarities and differences among the emergency preparedness 
structures; we can discuss diversity in the architecture of Arctic emergency pre-
paredness and potential outcomes.
Before we turn to the emergency preparedness structures, we shall spare a few 
words to lay out how Russia itself is structured, and where the Russian Arctic sits 
within this structure. As a federation, Russia’s state power is divided between two 
levels: the federal and regional levels. On the regional level there are more than 80 
entities, the regions or federal subjects -- which is the formal Russian term. The 
regions are again subdivided into numerous municipalities, the local level. Since 
2000, the regions have been grouped together into super-regions, the federal dis-
tricts, of which there are now eight. The Russian Arctic is not a clearly delineated 
area, but generally refers to all Russian territory north of the Arctic Circle. The 
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation on the other hand, is a clearly defined land 
area that consists of a selection of regions and municipalities belonging to four dif-
ferent federal districts.12 This zone was created in 2014 in relation to the Russian 
government’s launch of a state programme for “Socio-economic development of the 
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation until 2020”.13 The Arctic zone is thus not a 
super-region like the federal districts; however, it is an area with particular needs 
and challenges that have resulted in a targeted state programme. While the Arctic 
zone benefits from being clearly demarcated, it is a distinct drawback that it only 
covers land territory and not the Arctic seas. Emergency preparedness at sea is an 
important part of Arctic emergency preparedness. I therefore use the less precise 
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term Russian Arctic so as not to exclude the maritime domain in this treatment of 
the Arctic in Russia’s emergency preparedness.
3 Search and Rescue and Oil Spill Response in the Russian Arctic
SAR and OSR both fall within Russia’s unified state system for prevention and 
liquidation of emergencies (Rossiyskaya edinnaya gosudarstvennaya sistema predupre-
zhdeniya i likvidatsii chrezvychaynykh situatsiy, RSChS). The RSChS is a complex 
and loosely defined system that includes managing bodies, forces and resources 
belonging to federal and regional executive bodies, local self-governing bodies and 
organisations that deal with questions pertinent to the protection of people and 
territory from emergencies.14 The system functions on five levels: federal, interre-
gional, regional, municipal and object. There are managing bodies on each level 
including coordinating bodies, permanent management bodies and day-to-day 
management bodies.15 The RSChS has both territorial and functional subsystems. 
The territorial subsystems are formed in each region (federal subject) and unite the 
RSChS bodies operating on a region’s territory. Among Russia’s many regions, 
there are eight whose land territories have been included in the Arctic Zone of 
the Russian Federation -- either fully or in part: Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Nenets, 
Komi, Yamalo-Nenets, Krasnoyarsk, Sakha and Chukotka (Figure 1). With the 
exception of Komi, which is landlocked, these regions also command Russia’s Arc-
tic coast. As an example of what the territorial subsystems in the RSChS look like, 
we will take a look at the regional emergency preparedness system in the Mur-
mansk Region.
Murmansk is located in the Northwestern Russian Arctic and is the gatekeeper 
for access further into the Russian Arctic and to the Northern Sea Route from the 
West. Due to favourable climatic conditions, the region is easily accessible and well- 
developed relative to its Arctic location, and it plays a central role in developing the 
Russian Arctic. The Murmansk regional emergency preparedness system is led by the 
Main Directorate of Russia’s Ministry for Emergencies for the Murmansk Region 
(Glavnoye upravleniye MChS Rossii po Murmanksoy Oblasti). This body was set up in 
2005 and oversees a long list of emergency preparedness bodies in the region.16 The 
relationship between the various bodies in this territorial system is somewhat unclear. 
For example, SAR formations, including the Murmansk Arctic Complex Emergency 
Rescue Centre in Kirovsk, are listed as one of 13 headings in the Main Directorate’s 
overview of its ‘forces and resources’.17 These same SAR formations also appear as 
subordinate bodies under one of the other headings in the list, that of the territorial 
fire and rescue garrison of the Murmansk Region.18 Many of the bodies under the 
Main Directorate are firefighting bodies. There are no designated OSR bodies listed 
among the Main Directorate’s bodies.
Ingvill Moe Elgsaas
294
F
ig
ur
e 
1.
 T
er
ri
to
ri
al
 s
ub
sy
st
em
s 
in
 t
he
 R
S
C
hS
 t
ha
t 
co
ve
r 
th
e 
R
us
si
an
 A
rc
ti
c
S
ou
rc
e:
 A
ut
ho
r.
 T
he
 a
ut
ho
ri
ti
es
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 f
or
 t
he
se
 s
ub
sy
st
em
s 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
F
ig
ur
e 
2.
 F
un
ct
io
na
l s
ub
sy
st
em
s 
in
 t
he
 R
S
C
hS
 t
ha
t 
ha
nd
le
 S
A
R
 a
nd
 O
S
R
.
S
ou
rc
e:
 A
ut
ho
r.
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
lis
t 
of
 f
un
ct
io
na
l s
ub
sy
st
em
s 
in
 t
he
 R
S
C
hS
 (
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
of
 t
he
 R
us
si
an
 F
ed
er
at
io
n,
 2
00
3)
 w
it
h 
up
da
te
s 
an
d 
am
en
dm
en
ts
 (
17
 M
ay
 2
01
7)
. T
he
 a
ut
ho
ri
ti
es
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 f
or
 t
he
se
 s
ub
sy
st
em
s 
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. T
he
 b
ro
ke
n 
lin
e 
ar
ou
nd
 t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 
fo
r 
ha
nd
lin
g 
em
er
ge
nc
ie
s 
of
 t
he
 N
at
io
na
l G
ua
rd
 il
lu
st
ra
te
s 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
ie
s 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 p
ot
en
ti
al
 S
A
R
 a
nd
 O
S
R
 in
 t
hi
s 
sy
st
em
.
RS
Ch
S 
   
   
   
   
   
 
(M
Ch
S)
 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 
in
 M
ur
m
an
sk
 
Re
gi
on
 
(M
Ch
S 
M
ai
n 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 fo
r 
th
e 
M
ur
m
an
sk
 
Re
gi
on
) 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 
in
 A
rk
ha
ng
el
sk
 
Re
gi
on
 (M
Ch
S 
M
ai
n 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 fo
r 
th
e 
A
rk
ha
ng
el
sk
 
Re
gi
on
) 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 
in
 N
en
et
s 
Re
gi
on
 (M
Ch
S 
M
ai
n 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 fo
r 
th
e 
N
en
et
s 
Re
gi
on
) 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 
in
 K
om
i R
eg
io
n 
(M
Ch
S 
M
ai
n 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 fo
r 
th
e 
Ko
m
i 
Re
gi
on
) 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 
in
 Y
am
al
o-
N
en
et
s 
Re
gi
on
 
(M
Ch
S 
M
ai
n 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 fo
r 
th
e 
Ya
m
al
o-
N
en
et
s 
Re
gi
on
) 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 
in
 K
ra
sn
oy
ar
sk
 
Re
gi
on
 (M
Ch
S 
M
ai
n 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 fo
r 
th
e 
Kr
as
no
ya
rs
k 
Re
gi
on
) 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 
in
 S
ak
ha
 R
eg
io
n 
(M
Ch
S 
M
ai
n 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 fo
r 
th
e 
Sa
kh
a 
Re
gi
on
) 
Em
er
ge
nc
y 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
. 
in
 C
hu
ko
tk
a 
Re
gi
on
 (M
Ch
S 
M
ai
n 
D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
 fo
r 
th
e 
Ch
uk
ot
ka
 
Re
gi
on
) 
RS
Ch
S 
   
   
   
   
   
 
(M
Ch
S)
 
SA
R 
in
 in
te
rn
al
 
w
at
er
s 
an
d 
th
e 
te
rr
ito
ri
al
 s
ea
 
(M
in
is
tr
y 
fo
r 
Em
er
ge
nc
ie
s)
 
SA
R 
at
 s
ea
 
(M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
Tr
an
sp
or
t)
 
O
SR
 a
t s
ea
 
(M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
Tr
an
sp
or
t)
 
O
SR
 in
 in
te
rn
al
 
w
at
er
w
ay
s 
(M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
Tr
an
sp
or
t)
 
SA
R 
fo
r 
ci
vi
l 
av
ia
o
n 
(M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
Tr
an
sp
or
t)
 
Em
er
ge
nc
ie
s 
of
 
th
e 
A
rm
ed
 
Fo
rc
es
   
  
(M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
D
ef
en
ce
) 
Em
er
ge
nc
ie
s 
of
 
th
e 
N
a
on
al
 
G
ua
rd
   
 
(N
a
on
al
 G
ua
rd
)  
The Arctic in Russia’s Emergency Preparedness System
295
Turning to the functional subsystems, the RSChS has 44 such subsystems. These 
include SAR in internal waters and the territorial sea, SAR at sea, OSR at sea, OSR 
in internal waterways, and SAR for civil aviation (Figure 2).19 The Ministry of Emer-
gencies (MChS) is responsible for SAR in internal waters and the territorial sea 
(sometimes referred to as “SAR on land”), and the Ministry of Transport is respon-
sible for SAR at sea, OSR at sea, OSR in internal waterways, and SAR for civil avia-
tion. In addition to the functional subsystems that explicitly address SAR and OSR 
there is at least one other relevant functional subsystem in the RSChS. The Ministry 
of Defence is responsible for a subsystem that handles all emergencies pertaining to 
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet is a 
central participant in emergency preparedness in the Arctic and it is therefore appro-
priate to include this subsystem here. Another subsystem has recently been added to 
the RSChS, a subsystem for emergencies pertaining to the National Guard’s troops. 
This system may also involve SAR and OSR, but a lack of information makes it dif-
ficult to assess at present.
We now turn to the organisation of these functional subsystems. The discussions 
are organised according to the responsible authorities, starting with the Ministry for 
Emergencies in section 3.1. Section 3.2 looks at the functional subsystems belong-
ing to the Ministry of Transport. Section 3.3 looks at military SAR and OSR, with a 
focus on the Ministry of Defence and with cursory observations about the National 
Guard.
3.1 Ministry for Emergencies
The Ministry for Emergencies (MChS) is responsible for SAR in internal waters 
and the territorial sea. The organisation of this system is presented in the “Provision 
on the Functional Subsystem for SAR in Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea of 
the Russian Federation in the RSChS”.20 In line with the general stipulations for the 
RSChS, the system for SAR in internal waters and the territorial sea is organised 
into five levels with coordinating bodies, permanent management bodies and bodies 
responsible for the day-to-day management. The MChS is also responsible for the 
overall coordination of the RSChS itself, as well as being responsible for several 
other functional subsystems. The ministry carries out its responsibilities through its 
network of territorial divisions as well as specialised bodies. On the regional level, 
MChS’ territorial divisions follow the country’s territorial-political structure (the 
federal subjects). The interregional level deviates from the federal districts and 
instead groups the federal subjects into four emergency preparedness regions: Sibe-
ria, South, Central and Northwest.21
The MChS has a specialised SAR service that is organised into eight regional 
SAR detachments, which correspond with the federal districts, and 38 branches. 
The MChS’ SAR service also has a central rescue service, “Tsentrospas”, and spe-
cialised units, including an Arctic rescue research and training centre, “Vytegra”. In 
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addition to “Vytegra” (located outside the Arctic in Andomskoye, Vologda Region), 
the MChS has five Arctic rescue centres: Vorkuta Arctic Integrated Emergency 
Rescue Centre, Murmansk Arctic Emergency Rescue Centre (based in Kirovsk), 
Nenets Arctic Emergency Rescue Centre (based in Naryan-Mar), Arkhangelsk Arc-
tic Emergency Rescue Centre, and Dudinka Arctic Emergency Rescue Centre. All 
these centres belong to the Northwestern SAR detachment, except for the Dudinka 
centre that belongs to the Siberian SAR detachment.22 As part of Russia’s ongo-
ing drive to expand activities in the Arctic, there is an ambition to open 10 MChS 
rescue centres along the Arctic coast. Initially, the 10 centres were to be opened by 
2015 but due to lack of funding the time frame has been extended to 2020. It is not 
altogether clear how these 10 centres relate to the centres presented above, as lists 
of the 10 “new” SAR centres include some but not all of the MChS’ existing SAR 
centres. For example, in December 2016, it was reported that four out of 10 centres 
are operational: Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Naryan-Mar and Dudinka.23 Much hope 
is pinned on these centres to increase emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic. 
However, even before they are operational, analysts are questioning if these centres, 
should they all become operational, will be enough to bring the Northern Sea Route 
up to the level of international safety standards.24 These rescue centres illustrate 
both a drive to improve emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic, as well as 
its limitations, including financial restraints, which underscores the importance of 
comprehensive emergency preparedness in the region.
3.2 Ministry of Transport
The Ministry of Transport is responsible for six functional subsystems in the RSChS. 
Four of these include either SAR or OSR: SAR at sea, OSR at sea, OSR in inter-
nal waterways, and SAR for civil aviation.25 A Ministry of Transport subsidiary is 
responsible for the three subsystems covering the sea and internal waterways, the 
Federal Agency for Marine and River Transport (Rosmorrechflot). Another Minis-
try of Transport subsidiary is responsible for SAR for civil aviation, the Federal Air 
Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya).
Rosmorrechflot is responsible for SAR and OSR at sea as well as OSR in internal 
waterways. The provisions on the two functional subsystems for SAR and OSR at sea 
describe similar organisations, but whereas the provision for SAR presents two levels 
(federal and regional), the provision for OSR at sea presents three levels (federal, 
regional and object).26 Rosmorrechflot coordinates both systems through its Com-
mission for prevention and liquidation of emergency situations and fire safety. Ros-
morrechflot’s Operative staff for prevention and liquidation of emergency situations 
and fire safety is listed as the system’s managing body. A Rosmorrechflot subsidiary, 
the State Maritime Emergency and Rescue-coordination Service (Gosmorspass-
luzhba) is identified as the system’s permanent management body. Gosmorspass-
luzhba operates a central State Maritime Rescue-coordination Centre (federal level); 
regional maritime rescue coordination centres, maritime rescue sub-centres, basin 
The Arctic in Russia’s Emergency Preparedness System
297
emergency rescue administrations (BASU) and administrations for emergency res-
cue and underwater engineering work (all on the regional level). Additionally, for 
OSR at sea, permanent management bodies on the object level are duty and dis-
patch services of maritime transport organisations, ports, Rosmorport’s branches, 
shipping companies and other organisations that engage in prospecting for, or the 
production, processing, transportation or storage of oil at sea.27 According to Gos-
morspassluzhba’s webpage, the service has nine branches, including a “Northern 
branch” located in Murmansk and an “Arkhangelsk branch”. The service operates 
a number of rescue coordination centres, including a regional rescue coordination 
centre in Murmansk and a maritime rescue sub-centre in Arkhangelsk. There is also 
a basin emergency rescue administration in Murmansk with a branch in Arkhan-
gelsk. According to Gosmorspassluzhba, the service and its branches and rescue 
coordination centres make up the RSChS’ functional subsystems for responding to 
emergencies relating to SAR and OSR at sea.28
Rosmorrechflot is also responsible for OSR in internal waterways. The relevant 
provision was adopted in 2016.29 This system operates on three levels: federal, 
regional (basin) and object, and is coordinated by commissions on prevention and 
liquidation of emergencies and ensuring fire safety. Rosmorrechflot’s commission is 
on the federal level, the administrations for internal water basins’ commissions is on 
the regional level and “relevant organisations” are on the object level.30 The perma-
nent management bodies are Rosmorrechflot, the administrations for internal water 
basins, and structural divisions of organisations engaged in prospecting and explora-
tion, extraction, processing transportation, transshipment, bunkering, or storage of 
oil and petroleum products and organisations authorised to carry out OSR. Day-to-
day management is carried out by the duty service of the Rosmorrechflot and Gos-
morspassluzhba on the federal level, and by the duty service of the administrations 
for internal water basins on the regional level. On the object level, this responsibility 
rests with the duty-dispatch services of the organisations engaged in the above listed 
activities. Throughout the provision on OSR in internal waterways, Rosmorrechflot 
is referred to simply as “the competent body”, a term which does little to facilitate 
quick and unambiguous communication with the reader.
OSR in internal waterways is the last of the functional subsystems to be opera-
tionalised and it challenges established truths in Russia’s emergency preparedness. It 
has been customary to describe the emergency preparedness system as consisting of 
a sea component and a land component, with the Ministry of Transport responsible 
for SAR and OSR at sea and the Ministry of Emergencies responsible for SAR and 
OSR on land. Hence the reference to MChS’ SAR in internal waters and the territo-
rial sea as “SAR on land”. Following this logic, OSR in internal waterways should be 
“OSR on land” and should figure among the MChS’ responsibilities. What is more, 
there is consensus among scholars and practitioners that SAR and OSR at sea and 
SAR and OSR on land operate independently of one another.31 The jury is out as 
to what practical consequences it has that “OSR on land” has been allocated to the 
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authorities traditionally in charge of the sea component. This raises serious ques-
tions about where we draw the lines of responsibility between the different systems. 
This is also interesting in light of the observation that a focus on the sea component 
of Arctic OSR appears to have side-lined the land component.32
The matter of unclear lines of responsibility does not just pertain to OSR, but also 
to SAR in the Russian Arctic. According to Viktor Ilyukhin, the many actors involved 
in Russian SAR perform similar tasks and often in the same area with resulting 
SAR preparedness being insufficient.33 Poor coordination of SAR resources means, 
according to Ilyukhin, that it is easier for the regional rescue coordination centre 
in Murmansk to receive airborne assistance from Norway than it is to get Russian 
aircrafts in the air.34 There is a plan for SAR cooperation, the Plan for Cooperation 
among Federal Executive Bodies when undertaking Search and Rescue Activities 
at Sea and in Water Basins of the Russian Federation.35 According to this plan, the 
MChS coordinates SAR activities while both the MChS and the Ministry of Trans-
port organise work in their respective areas of responsibility. It further states that 
the MChS and the Ministry of Transport participate in SAR activities alongside 
the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural 
Resources*, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy*, the Federal Fisheries Committee*, 
the Federal Border Service*, and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Ministry of 
the Interior, the Ministry of Health and Medical Industry*, the Ministry of Com-
munications*, and the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental 
Monitoring supply support resources. Organising SAR training and exercises is the 
responsibility of the MChS (in water basins) and the Ministry of Transport (at sea). 
As illustrated by the defunct titles (marked by*), the plan for SAR cooperation is not 
a living document. There is no equivalent plan for cooperation in OSR. Outdated 
regulation does little to alleviate the unclear relationship between and within the 
systems. An illustrative example of outdated regulation is provided by Alexey Bam-
bulyak, Are Sydnes and Maria Sydnes’ survey of key legislative documents regu lating 
OSR activities in Russia.36 Solving these organisational and regulatory idiosyncrasies 
of SAR and OSR falls beyond the scope of this paper and so we must content our-
selves with these observations for the time being, and turn our attention to the fourth 
functional subsystem of the Ministry of Transport.
Rosaviatsiya is responsible for the unified system for aerospace search and res-
cue in the Russian Federation (edinaya sistema aviatsionno-kosmicheskogo poiska i 
spaseniya v Rossiyskoy Federatsii), aerospace SAR. Aerospace SAR is organised into 
zones that correspond to the zones in the unified system for air traffic management.37 
Four zones cover the Russian Arctic and several regional SAR bases are located in 
the Arctic: Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Naryan Mar, and Vorkuta in the Northwest-
ern aerospace SAR zone; Salekhard in the Urals aerospace SAR zone; Khatanga 
and Norilsk in the Siberian aerospace SAR zone; and Tiksi and Anadyr in the Far 
Eastern aerospace SAR zone.38 Aerospace SAR is organised on three levels: federal, 
The Arctic in Russia’s Emergency Preparedness System
299
regional and local. Managing bodies are presented somewhat differently in the pro-
vision on the aerospace SAR system approved by the Russian government in 2007, 
and in the provision on aerospace SAR as a functional subsystem approved by the 
Ministry of Transport in 2012. According to the former, aerospace SAR has lead-
ing (rukovodyashchie) bodies on the federal and regional levels (Rosaviatsiya and its 
territorial bodies) and operative bodies on the federal, regional and local levels (the 
Main Aviation Coordination Centre for SAR, aviation coordination centres for SAR, 
and flight control authorities).39 According to the description of this system as a 
functional subsystem in the RSChS, there are coordinating bodies, permanent man-
agement bodies, and bodies responsible for the day-to-day management on all three 
levels.40 The governmental and ministerial provisions are both in effect. This exam-
ple serves to illustrate a point that affects the RSChS more generally. It seems that 
an array of emergency preparedness systems have been “rounded up” and included 
in the RSChS without explicitly addressing their structures that do not conform to 
the prescribed structure of the RSChS.
3.3 Military SAR and OSR
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the RSChS’ functional subsystem for 
prevention and liquidation of emergencies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Fed-
eration.41 It is understood that the Ministry of Defence’s responsibilities for handling 
emergencies also extend to security related entities outside of the Armed Forces. 
According to Viktor Ilyukhin (who refers to the Russian Maritime College), the 
Ministry of Defence is responsible for organising SAR to recover air and sea vessels 
belonging to the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
as well as those belonging to the Ministry of Defence itself.42 Since the time of 
Ilyukhin’s writing, many of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ forces have been trans-
ferred to the National Guard (more on this below).
Military activities in the Arctic are concentrated in the Northern Fleet based on 
the Kola Peninsula in the Northwestern Russian Arctic. The Northern Fleet is the 
centrepiece in the new “Arctic military district” (Joint Strategic Command “North”) 
that became operational 1 December 2014. The Northern Fleet’s HQ is located in 
Severomorsk (Murmansk Region), one of 11 locations listed as the main bases for the 
Russian Navy’s SAR system (sistema poiskovo-spasatelnogo obespecheniya Voenno-Mor-
skogo Flota).43 The only other Arctic location in the list is Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk 
Region), another base of the Northern Fleet. The command of the Navy SAR system 
is as follows: the Navy General Staff (Navy SAR Service) in Saint Petersburg; the 
fleet headquarters (fleet SAR administrations) including Severomorsk (Northern 
Fleet); headquarters of formations (formations’ SAR services) including the White 
Sea naval base in Severodvinsk (Northern Fleet); and administrations and staffs of 
naval aviation units and formations.44 This four-level SAR structure adheres to the 
Navy’s structure and command.
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The Navy’s SAR system is an integral part of the functional subsystem in the 
RSChS for prevention and liquidation of emergencies of the Russian Armed Forces. 
This effectively makes Navy SAR a sub-subsystem in the RSChS. It is reasonable to 
assume that there may be more Navy SAR capacities present in the Russian Arctic 
than this presentation indicates. Only two SAR bases appear modest compared to 
the level of activities of the Russian Navy in the region, and the Concept for Devel-
oping the Navy’s Search and Rescue System cited here only lists the system’s main 
bases.
The National Guard was created in July 2016.45 In October 2016, a new subsystem 
in the RSChS was also created: the functional subsystem for prevention and liqui-
dation of emergencies of the National Guard.46 Due to the novelty of the National 
Guard and a lack of information about the RSChS subsystem for emergencies of the 
National Guard, it is difficult to discuss its potential role in Arctic SAR and OSR.47 
There are just a couple of observations that can be made that may affect SAR and 
OSR. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose interior troops and various special forces 
were transferred to the National Guard upon its creation,48 did not have a functional 
subsystem equivalent to that created for the National Guard.49 SAR for the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs’ vessels used to be among the responsibilities of the Ministry of 
Defence.50 Since the creation of a subsystem that designates that  emergencies of 
National Guard forces are to be handled by the National Guard itself, it is reasonable 
to assume that this subsystem should now include SAR, and potentially also OSR. 
Why there is a need for an RSChS functional subsystem for the National Guard, 
when there was no such need for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is an open question.
4 Counterterrorism in the Russian Arctic
Unlike SAR and OSR, CT has not grown dynamically in tandem with or in response 
to developments in the Arctic. Arctic counterterrorism is an imposition and the 
result of a combination of factors external to the region itself. Expansive ambitions 
of international terrorists play a role here. So does the very nature of counterterror-
ism, which supports pre-emptively countering terrorism in regions not commonly 
associated with such a threat. In Russia’s case, the country’s extensive experience 
with terrorism speaks to the inclusion of counterterrorism whenever and wherever 
safety and security is addressed. Also, unlike SAR and OSR, CT is not included in 
the RSChS. Instead, there is a separate system responsible for fighting terrorism, the 
national system for counterterrorism (obshchegosudarstvennaya sistema protivodeyst-
viya terrorizmu, OSPT).
4.1 The National System for Counterterrorism, OSPT
The OSPT is presented in the Concept on counterterrorism adopted in 2009.51 The 
system consists of the totality of entities that fights terrorism and the normative legal 
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acts that regulate their activities. Entities that fight terrorism are federal, regional 
and local authorities whose competencies include measures to combat terrorism, 
non-governmental organisations and associations, and citizens who participate in 
implementing counterterrorist measures of said authorities. The OSPT is organised 
into two levels: the federal and regional levels. Federal coordination is the prerog-
ative of the National Antiterrorism Committee (NAC). Regional coordination is 
implemented by antiterrorism commissions in each region (federal subject) that are 
subordinate to the NAC. The NAC also oversees a Federal Operative Staff as well as 
regional operative staffs in each region. These coordinating bodies are responsible for 
resource planning and managing counterterrorist operations. Using the same criteria 
as when we identified territorial subsystems of the RSChS in the Arctic above, the 
regions whose antiterrorism commissions and operative staffs cover Russia’s Arctic 
territory are: Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Nenets, Komi, Yamalo-Nenets, Krasnoyarsk, 
Sakha and Chukotka (Figure 3). Only here we are not dealing with subsystems, but 
regional coordination of the OSPT.
Figure 3. The OSPT’s coordinating bodies responsible for the Russian Arctic
Source: Author
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The central body in the OSPT is the NAC. This 23-member-strong body brings 
together leading officials from a string of different state agencies who all serve ex 
officio. The NAC is chaired by the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), 
who appoints the leader of the Federal Operative Staff. A deputy FSB director serves 
as deputy NAC chairman, alongside the Minister of Internal Affairs, and leads the 
NAC Apparatus. Other members include the Minister for Emergencies, the Minis-
ter of Transport, the Minister of Defence, and, since December 2016, the Director 
of the National Guard.52 On the regional level, the antiterrorism commissions are 
chaired by the governors, but the FSB plays a central role on this level too. The heads 
of the regional FSB branches serve as deputy chairmen in the regional antiterrorism 
commissions, as well as leaders of the regional operative staffs. The NAC members 
listed here serve to illustrate considerable overlap in central actors participating in 
SAR, OSR and CT.
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Counterterrorism shows a flat structure with two levels and adheres to the terri-
torial organisation of state power in the Russian Federation. Decision-making is 
concentrated in the NAC, and in the hands of the FSB. This structure is almost sur-
prisingly simple, especially in light of the overwhelming complexity of the RSChS, 
and also the asymmetry of the terrorist threat Russia is faced with today. Terrorist 
attacks are concentrated in the south of the country, in the North Caucasus. Some 
have also been carried out in Moscow and other large cities, but most of Russia, 
including the Arctic, is all but untouched by terrorism. Even so, the OSPT has been 
fashioned to cover the whole of the Russian Federation, including the Arctic, with 
a symmetrical structure to coordinate the fight against terrorism. Unlike SAR and 
OSR, particular challenges have not been addressed by adding layers and special-
ised subsystems. This is arguably not the result of the task at hand, but rather how 
it is tackled. One can easily envision a different approach with added layers and 
specialised subsystems to account for special challenges here as well. The particu-
lar challenges posed in the North Caucasus Federal District, which was separated 
out from the Southern Federal District in 2010, almost beckons the insertion of an 
interregional level between the federal and regional levels. Instead, the presidential 
plenipotentiary for the North Caucasus Federal District has been included in the 
NAC. Thus, particular attention is paid to a particularly challenging area without 
disrupting the simple logic of the two-level, territorial structure.
The FSB’s central role in the OSPT must also be seen in relation to the varied 
tasks and extensive organisation of this security service. Among FSB’s many tasks are 
controlling the border and providing coastguard services in the Arctic. To carry out 
these and other tasks, the service has a regional administration in each of Russia’s 
regions, including those in the Arctic, and in many of their municipalities. The FSB 
is present throughout the Russian state and its bureaucracy, including the Armed 
Forces where it is tasked with military counterintelligence.53 The latter includes an 
FSB counterintelligence administration in the Northern Fleet.
Whither goes the National Guard? As we saw above, the National Guard was created 
in 2016 and now commands many of the forces previously under the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. The National Guard has been equipped with an extensive portfolio 
of tasks, including fighting terrorism.54 This task in particular has been emphasised 
as a main objective of the National Guard, both by the service itself and by Presi-
dent Putin.55 In December 2016, the director of the National Guard was included 
among the members in the NAC.56 The National Guard did not, however, take over 
the position of deputy NAC chairman, a post still occupied by the Minister of Inter-
nal Affairs. The creation of the National Guard raises more questions than we can 
answer. Theories about the “true purpose” of this powerful service abound, and fall 
outside the scope of the current paper. Time will tell whither goes the National 
Guard. The many unknowns surrounding this fresh addition to Russia’s already 
densely populated security and intelligence sector fuels concerns that there is a 
potential “turf war” on the horizon. Such an eventuality could have adverse effects 
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on coordination of the OSPT in the short term, and for the FSB’s leading position 
in Russian counterterrorism in the long term.
5 The Architecture of Emergency Preparedness in the Russian Arctic
On the face of it, interrelations between SAR and OSR make our work easier by 
there being only two systems to compare and include in the architecture of Arctic 
emergency preparedness: the RSChS and the OSPT. The complexity of the RSChS 
quickly quells any such optimism, however. Rather than one system for SAR and 
OSR, we are in reality dealing with 15 systems: eight territorial subsystems that 
cover the Arctic and seven functional subsystems that either have SAR or OSR as 
their targeted function or where such activities are included in broader portfolios. 
Are we best served considering the architecture of Arctic emergency preparedness 
as made up of 1+1 structures, the RSChS and the OSPT? Or should we consider 
the architecture of Arctic emergency preparedness as made up of 15+1 structures, 
adding up the subsystems in the RSChS plus the OSPT? This choice greatly affects 
the architecture of Arctic emergency preparedness.
Let us first approach the problem with optimism and consider the architecture of 
Arctic emergency preparedness as a composite structure that brings together two sys-
tems, the RSChS for SAR and OSR and the OSPT for CT. Figure 4 shows how the 
RSChS and the OSPT compare in terms of how vertical/horizontal their structures 
are, whether they are territorially or functionally organised, and how centralised/
decentralised their decision-making is. The final column in Figure 4 categorises the 
resulting architecture of emergency preparedness according to the categories in Har-
rison and Klein’s diversity typology.
RSChS
structure
OSPT structure
Emergency preparedness 
architecture
Vertical/horizontal organisation
Tall
(5 levels)
Flat
(2 levels)
Maximum separation
Territorial or functional 
organisation
Territorial and 
functional
Territorial Moderate variety†
Decision-making in the 
organisation
Various actors NAC Maximum disparity
Figure 4. The Architecture of Emergency Preparedness in the Russian Arctic (I)
†Moderate variety is not a valid category when comparing two units on a categorical attribute.
Source: Author.
The RSChS has a tall structure with five levels, whereas the OSPT has a flat struc-
ture with two levels. This makes diversity within the architecture of Arctic emergency 
preparedness along the vertical-horizontal continuum a case of maximum separa-
tion. According to Harrison and Klein, homogeneity on a lateral continuum is often 
predicted to be beneficial, and the occurrence of homogeneity is more important 
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than where on the continuum it occurs. A high degree of separation on the other 
hand, is associated with low cohesion and poor performance.57
As for variety on the categorical attribute of territorial or functional organisation, 
the complex organisation of the RSChS with both territorial and functional subsys-
tems causes some problems. In an “ideal world”, we would have a dyad on our hands 
which could per definition produce either minimum or maximum variety.58 We are 
therefore faced with the “incorrect” result of a dyad that displays overlap in the cate-
gorical attribute. Such overlap is a characteristic associated with moderate variety, a 
category that can only exist when we consider more than two units. This points us in 
the direction of considering the RSChS as an association of multiple systems rather 
than as one system. Whilst “incorrect” in the present analysis, moderate variety is 
a potentially positive attribute, as it can lead to greater creativity and productivity, 
higher decision quality and increased flexibility. Moderate variety can also incur 
challenges such as problems with information sharing.59
In terms of decision-making, this is decentralised in the RSChS with a number 
of actors vested with significant decision making (the Main Directorates of MChS 
for the regions, Rosmorrechflot, Rosaviatsiya, and the Navy’s General Staff). In the 
OSPT decision-making is centralised in the FSB-dominated National Antiterror-
ism Committee. Considering decision-making as a valued and desired resource, the 
NAC enjoys an enviable position within the architecture. Maximum disparity arises 
precisely when one member outranks all others in terms of the desired resource. 
A high degree of disparity can lead to reduced performance as a result of within 
unit competition, suppression of creativity, withdrawal and interrupted flows of 
information.60
Overall, the architecture of Arctic emergency preparedness as made up of the 
RSChS and the OSPT shows significant potential challenges to comprehensive 
emergency preparedness in the Arctic. The task of assessing this architecture is, as 
we have seen, complicated by the structural asymmetry between the RSChS and 
the OSPT. The RSChS is a collection of systems, some of them territorial and oth-
ers functional. Considering the size and complexity of the RSChS, it appears as an 
artificial simplification to compare the RSChS and the OSPT one-to-one as shown 
in Figure 4. Even though the OSPT is not part of the RSChS, the OSPT does 
resemble the functional subsystems in the RSChS. According to the logic of the 
RSChS, the OSPT could have been included in this “super-system” on par with the 
functional subsystems. Assessing the architecture as a result of the RSChS-OSPT 
dyad arguably oversimplifies the topic and places unwarranted weight on the OSPT 
(in addition to the analytical challenge of the two systems showing a distorted form 
of moderate variety on our categorical attribute). To correct this skewness, we will 
look at the architecture of Arctic emergency preparedness as a superstructure made 
up of 16 systems: the OSPT, the seven functional subsystems in the RSChS that 
handle SAR and OSR, and the eight territorial subsystems in the RSChS that cover 
the Russian Arctic (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. The Architecture of Emergency Preparedness in the Russian Arctic (II)
*This represents the Navy’s SAR system, which is a subsystem in the functional subsystem for emergencies of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation in the RSChS.
**Missing values marked with “?”.
***Extrapolated based on the emergency system in the Murmansk Region.
Source: Author.
Figure 5 lists the 15 territorial and functional subsystems in the RSChS presented 
in section 3 alongside the OSPT, and categorises the resulting architecture of emer-
gency preparedness according to the categories in Harrison and Klein’s diversity 
typology. (For presentational purposes Figure 5 is inverted compared to Figure 4 
with the organisational principles in the columns and the many structures in the 
rows.) Figure 5 shows the diversity within the RSChS and allows for a more fine-
tuned comparison of the SAR, OSR and CT structures. A necessary consequence is 
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that the relative weight of the OSPT within the architecture drops from 1/2 to 1/16. 
In practice, the comparison is of 15 systems including the OSPR as the values for the 
system pertaining to the National Guard are missing.
Among the 15 systems, there are flat, moderate and tall structures. This means 
that diversity within the architecture of Arctic emergency preparedness along the 
vertical-horizontal continuum is a case of moderate separation. Most of the systems 
have moderate structures with three levels (11 systems) or 4 levels (one system). Two 
systems have flat structures with 2 levels, and just one system has a tall structure with 
five levels. Diversity as separation on the vertical/horizontal continuum was grossly 
over-reported in Figure 4 as the five-level structure of the RSChS has only fully been 
adopted in one of its subsystems. According to Harrison and Klein, investigators of 
diversity as separation posit that greater similarity -- reduced separation -- yields 
higher levels of cooperation.61
Turning now to our categorical attribute of territorial and functional organisation 
and the degree of variety, the architecture of emergency preparedness shows mod-
erate variety with substantial overlap in some, but not all, of the components. As we 
saw above, moderate variety can incur challenges such as problems with information 
sharing, but it is also associated with many positive predicted outcomes, such as 
greater creativity and productivity, higher decision quality and increased flexibility.62
When it comes to decision-making, the architecture of Arctic emergency prepared-
ness presented in Figure 5 shows several central decision-makers including the Main 
Directorates of the MChS, central bodies under the Ministry of Transport (Rosmor-
rechflot and Rosaviatsiya), the Navy’s General Staff and NAC. This moves the analysis 
away from an overestimation of NAC’s role as a decision-making body within the 
architecture, and rightly places it among several important decision-making bodies 
involved in SAR, OSR and CT. Moderate disparity of the desired resource reduces the 
potential for negative effects such as withdrawal and interrupted flows of information.63
Structural potential for developing comprehensive emergency preparedness in the 
Russian Arctic appears more favourable when we consider the architecture of Arctic 
emergency preparedness as the composite structure made up of the subsystems in 
the RSChS plus the OSPT. In theory, there is opportunity for cooperation and flexi-
bility in this architecture. There is also potential for competition within the archi-
tecture, which can improve or weaken performance. There is still some potential 
for withdrawal or interrupted flows of information among those in the architecture. 
We cannot, however, disregard the empirical fact that a vast number of emergency 
preparedness systems have been “rounded up” in the RSChS, and the OSPT has 
not been included. Nor should we disregard the potential for separation, variety and 
disparity inherent in the list of (sub)systems in Figure 5 that fall beyond the scope 
of the current analysis. Neither in Figure 4 nor in Figure 5 do we find even a single 
instance of minimal separation, variety or disparity. In other words, the architecture 
of emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic is rife with differences, both in kind 
and in degree, rather than similarities.
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6 Conclusions
Activity in the Arctic has increased over the past few decades and is projected 
to increase further in future. More activity in the region, and more varied activ-
ity, necessitates improvements in Arctic emergency preparedness. This need for 
improved emergency preparedness pertains to both traditional and untraditional 
emergency preparedness fields. SAR and OSR have long been on the agenda for 
improving the safety of people and the environment in the Arctic as activity in the 
region grows. Lately, CT has also joined the agenda as a result of the abundance of 
strategic resources in the Arctic, the expanding threat posed by terrorist organisa-
tions, and recognition that the latter may target the former.
This paper has examined the formal institutional foundation for a comprehensive 
emergency preparedness system in the Russian Arctic through a comparative anal-
ysis of SAR, OSR and CT structures. The main conclusion of the paper is that the 
current organisation of these three fields poses a significant obstacle to tackling SAR, 
OSR and CT challenges comprehensively. This conclusion rests on the fact that 
there are wide discrepancies among the many emergency systems involved in SAR, 
OSR and CT in the Russian Arctic, and that correlation and coordination among 
these systems are either lacking or wanting. Furthermore, most of these systems are 
also faced with coordination challenges of their own, which aggravates challenges to 
potential inter-system coordination.
SAR and OSR activities are organised into multiple systems. Additionally, there 
is an emergency system specific to the Armed Forces (and potentially an emergency 
system specific to the National Guard) that also includes SAR and OSR activities. 
This system, which is also a functional subsystem in the RSChS, is managed by 
the Ministry of Defence and includes the Navy’s own SAR system; effectively mak-
ing Navy SAR a functional sub-subsystem in the RSChS. While the importance of 
coordination among these systems and the various actors involved in SAR and OSR 
activities is acknowledged, regulation on such coordination is insufficient.
CT activities are united in one system, the OSPT, which is not part of the RSChS. 
Although CT activities, much like SAR and OSR activities, involve many and varied 
actors; the organisation of the OSPT is streamlined and simple. Coordinating bodies 
on the federal and regional levels reflect Russia’s federal structure. The most central 
positions in the OSPT’s coordinating bodies are occupied by the FSB. Leaving the 
potential challenge to FSB leadership posed by the National Guard aside; as yet, the 
leading role of the FSB in the OSPT’s coordinating bodies provides clear lines of 
responsibility in this field.
The two traditional emergency preparedness fields have in common that they make 
particular provisions for the Arctic. The OSPT, on the other hand, is a symmetrical 
system across the Russian Federation. Provisions for the Arctic within the various 
SAR and OSR systems contribute to the variance among these systems. Despite the 
abundance of relevant emergency preparedness systems and their provisions for the 
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Arctic, the literature available raises questions about the adequacy of SAR and OSR 
preparedness in the region. The symmetrical organisation of the OSPT does not make 
provisions for any challenges that may be specific to the Arctic. Since the Russian 
Arctic is relatively untouched by terrorism as compared to other parts of Russia, the 
symmetry in the organisation of CT arguably ensures more adequate preparedness in 
this region than any organisation making provisions for terrorist threats would.
Making use of the diversity typology developed by Harrison and Klein, we were able 
to synthesise the structure and potential outcomes of the architecture of emergency 
preparedness in the Russian Arctic. Due to the significant asymmetries between the 
RSChS and the OSPT, we made two versions of this architecture with highly differ-
ent results. By merging the RSChS and the OSPT, the resulting architecture showed 
maximum separation along the vertical/horizontal continuum, maximum disparity 
in decision-making and produced an analytically impossible result for territorial or 
functional organisation. Such a superstructure would, in theory, be associated with 
mainly negative outcomes, such as low cohesion and poor performance. By consid-
ering the architecture as a superstructure made up of 16 systems (15 in practice) the 
result was moderate separation, variety and disparity across the three variables. Such 
an architecture has, in theory, potential for cooperation, flexibility and high decision 
quality. This does show considerable potential for a well-functioning emergency pre-
paredness architecture, but must be tempered by the fact that we are talking about 
moderate diversity of various types, and not about similarities.
Based on the discussion in this paper, I posit that the two main obstacles to com-
prehensive emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic today, from a structural 
perspective, is the impenetrable complexity of Arctic SAR and OSR and the isolation 
of CT in Russia’s emergency preparedness. A potential window of opportunity for 
cooperation among the different systems despite these structural obstacles is the fact 
that many of the most central actors are involved in all three emergency prepared-
ness fields. Looking past the horizon of the current paper, I would venture to posit 
that these observations are significant beyond the scope of developing comprehen-
sive emergency preparedness in the Russian Arctic, as they also shape the potential 
for international endeavours to improve emergency preparedness in the Arctic.
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